Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2014

That We Are Underlings: The Real Problems in Disciplining
Political Spending and the First Amendment
Jedediah S. Purdy
Columbia Law School, jpurdy@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Jedediah S. Purdy, That We Are Underlings: The Real Problems in Disciplining Political Spending and the
First Amendment, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 391 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3242

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

PURDY ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

6/26/2015 3:23 PM

THAT WE ARE UNDERLINGS: THE REAL
PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINING POLITICAL
SPENDING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Jedediah Purdy∗
We’re gathered at the intersection of professional reason and
popular passion. The roughly two-thirds of Americans who have
1
said they strongly oppose Citizens United don’t have a theory of
2
the First Amendment; they have a felt sense that the decision is
an emblem of the political condition that unites Tea Partiers,
Occupiers, and the Warren wing of the Democratic Party in
shared disgust: the superior political influence and access of big
business and great fortunes. This is the condition, or a subset of
the condition, that Larry Lessig and Zephyr Teachout call
corruption rightly understood: structural corruption that tethers
the attention and loyalty of officials to the concerns of their
3
financial patrons.
We’re being asked to apply our special tools and questions—
conceptual coherence, doctrinal workability, alertness to
unintended consequences, and clashing values—to a problem that
popular passion has put on the agenda: we are discussing how, and
how far, this popular sentiment can take constitutional form. On
these questions I have little to add to what others have said on this
panel and throughout the day. I think there is room in a sensible
constitutional scheme to limit money’s role in politics. I have no
strong opinion about whether our doctrinal route should be an
expanded conception of corruption, which starts from the
∗ Robinson O. Everett Professor Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to
my co-panelist Larry Tribe and to David Grewal, Larry Lessig, and Zephyr Teachout for
helping me to understand my thinking on this topic.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.
3. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 276–90 (2014) (setting out
an anti-corruption principle as the basis of campaign finance regulation); Lawrence Lessig,
Out-Posting Post, in ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 97–105 (2014) (setting out a
version of the anti-corruption principle).
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Supreme Court’s holding that preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption is the only government purpose that can
4
justify restrictions on campaign spending; a revived idea of
political equality, the notion that equal citizenship should put a
limit on the disparity among different persons’ political efficacy;
or the idea that electoral integrity, maintaining the link between
public opinion and political outcomes, is a value internal to the
First Amendment and can justify limits on campaign expenditure.
To my mind, these are all paths to the same goal, which is
loosening the grip that private wealth now has on every stage of
the political process.
I should stress, I am not sanguine about writing Congress a
5
blank check to shape future elections, but I think the Buckley line
6
of cases, as elaborated in Citizens United and McConnell, shows
that if we apply the First Amendment’s intense skepticism toward
regulation too readily to campaign spending and donations, we
write a blank check to those who write the checks. For them,
unlike elected officials, there is no accountability to the public.
***
It is tempting, on the doctrinal level, to assert that First
Amendment law has arrived at an antimony—that because the
“money is not speech” slogan is superficial and unconvincing, and
discrimination among speakers is severely disfavored, there just is
no way to get hold of the problem of money in politics generally
(nor in the subset of corporate political spending). I have
advanced this argument myself in a popular essay, and I am afraid
it is true that it tracks the drift of First Amendment law since
7
Buckley v. Valeo. It is also true that it tracks the deep connection
between wealth and the power to exercise a potentially boundless
right like speech, the same connection that leads the radical-left
stance on campaign spending to be “no socialism, no
democracy!”—that is, as long as wealth is highly unequal, political
8
influence will be as well. In these respects, it has the charisma of
4.
5.
6.
7.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
See Jedediah Purdy, Undo Citizens United? We’d Only Scratch the Surface, THE
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/12/
undo-citizens-united-we-d-only-scratch-the-surface.html; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (establishing strong First Amendment protection for campaign expenditures).
8. See Nathan J. Robinson, Money Talks, JACOBIN (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.
jacobinmag.com/2015/01/capitalism-democracy-citizens-united/ (arguing that “capitalism
will always undermine the promise of democratic equality”).
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a double-headed realism: it is hard-nosed about what the law
really is, on the one hand, and, on the other, about how the world
really works. Between these two, it exercises a considerable
attraction.
But there is considerable space between these poles of
pessimistic realism for the modest optimism of a meliorative
liberalism. I am not convinced that there is anything in the logic
of the social practices that the First Amendment regulates, or in
the concept of speech, that requires the particular variety of
monomaniacal rigor that Supreme Court majorities have been
pursuing.
It seems to me that several concepts could do the doctrinal
work that is needed here. We need not worry too much about
whether it is structural corruption, a robust conception of
citizenship, or a division between the sphere of opinion formation
and that of self-governance (or at least popular feedback, on the
more restrictive intepretation). Any of these terms might serve
well enough to stand for a congeries of rules permitting regulation
of electoral spending. If the will is there to pursue the aim, the
doctrinal way will follow.
***
I’d like to step back from the technical questions to consider
their connection to the broader political moment. The advocates
for constitutional reform in this area have something in common
with the activists who helped spur the arguments for the
individual right to keep and bear arms, which the Supreme Court
identified in 2008, or the Commerce Clause arguments against the
Obamacare individual mandate that won five votes in 2012. Their
energy has to do with the special symbolic status of the
Constitution, the way that Americans identify with almost
axiomatically, so that (A) if the Constitution says it, it must be
right; and (B) if it’s right, the Constitution must say it. This politics
works at the level of identity as well as interest and strategy: it
speaks to the meaning people find in being Americans, and
whether they feel the country has a place for them, and (closely
related) whether they feel it is working or in crisis.
What is different about this constitutional ferment is that,
unlike fights about Obamacare, gun control, abortion, affirmative
action, marriage equality, and religious expression, it does not
simply rework the country’s partisan divides and identity politics
into constitutional language. Activists are arguing for trans-
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partisan, trans-community, specifically civic constitutional value.
Maybe more specifically, they are expressing their sense that
Citizens United offends such a value. Because arguing about the
Constitution is, in part, a way that we constitute ourselves as
Americans, we should understand this ferment as an attempt to
define, elevate, even create whatever constitutional commitment
would be the opposite of Citizens United.
I do not think it will do to say that money is property, not
speech. Regulating spending is not like saying that you can’t put
a sign on your car. Money is the universal means. You cannot
deny people the use of the means to a right, then claim to take the
right seriously.
But speech is par excellence the civil right that you can
exercise in proportion to your willingness to pay. Unlike rights of
privacy, equal protection, or due process, it has no natural
boundaries inhering in the person who exercises it. It just gets
bigger and bigger until you stop spending. One might say that
buying guns is analogous, but the second hundred million dollars
that you spend on speech is simultaneously effective with, and
probably as effective as, the first hundred million. Not true of your
millionth gun. Spending on speech is more akin to exercising the
right to raise your own militia. (Of course, at some point the next
million dollars makes little difference in a saturated media
market, or in relation to other constraints, such as limited voter
enthusiasm. The point is that only the wealthy can contribute to
such saturation; the declining marginal effectiveness of political
spending is a problem of the very rich.)
This wouldn’t so much matter if speech did not trench so
closely on elections and political power. I don’t think anyone
would doubt the constitutional right to spend your billions on
Scientology pamphlets or radio stations broadcasting arguments
against string theory.
But the way that political spending gives some people—
natural and artificial—a very big speech right and leaves others
very small trenches on a countervailing civic value. It is—and I am
being deliberately vague here, because I think the intuition people
have is vague and various—something about citizenship.
Maybe it is the idea—rejected by the Supreme Court, but we
are here to talk about overruling the Court—that, past a point,
citizens must be the same size, that the one-person-one-vote
principles expresses a commitment that touches on political
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speech, and should tug the doctrine away from its libertarian
acceptance that some people have big speech, some people small.
Maybe it is the idea that citizenship is a quality of natural
persons: that must be what we’re getting at when we say that
artificial persons don’t have constitutional rights. Surely we don’t
think the government could strip corporate assets without due
process because they don’t belong to natural people. We mean
they aren’t part of the political community.
Maybe it is the idea—present in the language of corruption—
that, for voters and, especially, their representatives, there is a
civic perspective that involves some idea of a common good, some
effort to show equal concern and respect for every member of the
community, and that excessive money in politics can (1) turn
representatives’ attention and loyalty away from these general
and inclusive perspectives to the narrower business of negotiating
patronage; and (2) post-Citizens United, gives potentially great
influence to entities whose legally ordained purpose is a narrow
version of self-interest.
Citizens United has become a symbolic stand-in for the
general perception that politicians are unresponsive, that
entrenched interests have too much power, that elections change
nothing. As Debbie Hellman has shown with respect to the
concept of corruption, once you try to turn these perceptions and
feelings into an account of a constitutionally valid purpose, you
need to articulate a positive idea of its opposite: an appropriately
9
civic form of politics and government. That is hard to do
conceptually, and probably politically as well: to begin with, Tea
Party libertarians may like stripping corporate personhood of
constitutional significance, but they are much less likely to go
along with further-reaching restrictions on spending, because they
tend to like wealthy individuals (just not collections of them under
the corporate form) and because of the intensity of their mistrust
of legislation. This is only the simplest example of the difficulty of
forging this civic movement into even the beginning of a coherent
view of how American democracy should look, as opposed to the
present overlapping consensus that it looks like death warmed
over.

9. See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013) (so arguing).
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One position that is tempting here is a radical one that simply
insists that civic equality will be a chimera until economic equality
approaches reality. This is the position that Walter Lippmann
called the “socialist” stance already in his 1930 The Phantom
Public, where he conceded that “[n]o serious student . . . would
dispute that socialist premise which asserts that the weight of
influence on society exercised by an individual is more nearly
related to the character of his property than to his abstract legal
10
citizenship.” As Lippmann acknowledged, this position has the
appeal of grasping the nettle: the “socialist” point is made less
frequently and less loudly, and by less respectable voices, than its
empirical force would seem to require in a country that one
influential quantitative study recently found highly unequal in the
11
distribution of political influence. This fact, in turn, implies a
harsh grim judgment on the boundaries of “respectable” speech
about speech. One of the refreshing things about the expansion of
political discourse in the last half-decade is that one can, again,
hear Lippmann’s “socialist” point made in avowedly socialist and
12
widely read, if not exactly respectable, publications.
What is less clear is whether the new new left of Brooklyn
Marxists is any closer than Lippmann’s contemporaries were to
resolving the problem that he set for them: to explain how
subjecting more of the economy to ongoing political oversight
13
could produce tolerable economic governance. More basically,
he denied that there was reason to believe that democratic
decisions would become informed and competent simply by virtue
of removing unequal economic power from the equation. Such an
idea, he insisted, must rest on “the mystical fallacy of democracy,
that the people, all of them, are competent” if only their remit
14
were greatly expanded.
The point here is that, for all the appeal that calling for real,
i.e., material equality instead of the equal liberty of rich and poor
alike to make million-dollar campaign donations, part of the
reason the Supreme Court is not committed to deepening the
10. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 37 (1930).
11. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (concluding
that “the majority does not rule) (emphasis original) and “America’s claims to being a
democratic society are seriously threatened”).
12. See Robinson, supra note 8.
13. LIPPMANN, supra note 10 at 37–38.
14. Id. at 38.
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democratization of American life is that a majority of the Justices,
like Lippmann, seem to think that we have all the democracy we
need. Moreover, they seem to agree with him that the democracy
we have forms an articulate and devastating judgment on
democracy as such. The democracy we have, that is, proves by its
inadequacy that it is all the democracy we need.
There is an old criticism of democracy, well expressed in
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10, to the effect that majorities
tend to be actuated by motives of greed (often enough for other
people’s things) and fanaticism (often of the religious variety, but
ideological too)—Madison might have considered an “improper
or wicked project” such as “[a] rage for . . . an equal division of
15
property” a blend of the two evils. It has often been combined
with a view the conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter
influentially expressed: that, while judgment tends to be
eminently rational in economic matters that affect one’s self,
political judgment is a domain of fantasy, projective speculation,
and emotionally driven illogic. When Justices Kennedy and Scalia
express their impatience with campaign-finance regulation and,
by contrast, praise the importance of the economic interests
represented by corporate donations, there is a subtext about
whose voice matters: the industrious and rational (to borrow a
phrase from John Locke), that is, the businessmen. The Justices
are not alone in this attitude.
***
The solution that Robert Post offers in his Tanner lectures
(published as Citizens Divided) has its roots in a compromise
position that Lippmann, Schumpeter, and others developed
earlier, with various inflections. Post distinguishes between what
we might call the discursive sphere of public-opinion formation,
where strict scrutiny of speech and spending regulations is
merited and no voice should ever be muted, and the decisive
sphere of elections, where authoritative decisions must be taken
through mediated majoritarianism. In the latter sphere, Post
argues, we can understand the state as playing a special and
appropriate administrative function to serve the [compelling]
interest of electoral integrity. By “electoral integrity,” Post means
nothing so robust as equal influence on decisions, but a rather unspecific public confidence that political institutions and processes
15.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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are responsive to public opinion. The basis for limiting spending
within the domain of electoral decision is to head off public
perceptions that governance has broken free of public
accountability and now answers only to its financiers.
This restricted specification of the democratic function goes
back to Lippmann and Schumpeter, for whom the purpose of
elections was to rotate elites through office, provide a brake
between state power and the organs and individuals of the
broader society, and resolve certain questions that arrived at
loggerheads within the usual mechanisms of elite governance. The
elevation of the discursive aspect of democracy, which is present
in John Dewey, Jurgen Habermas, and Post’s own work on
constitutional politics, represents a kind of compromise formation
between idealism about the self-rule of equal citizens and
cynicism about the competence of actually existing (or actually
16
feasible) democracy. If the sovereign function of collective selfrule must be restricted, at least the discursive activity of the polity
can roam free. And in discourse, Post argues, there is no
contradiction between equal citizenship and unequal economic
capacity: if we are arguing about string theory, drug policy, or the
advisability of humanitarian intervention, every checking account
may do its best. There is no normative weight to the thought that
each natural person should be equally able to influence the
opinions of others. In a peculiar sense, it is precisely because
public-opinion formation is assigned no governance tasks—that it
has no responsibility, makes nothing happen, as W.H. Auden
wrote of poetry (nothing directly traceable to it, anyway), that it
is plausible to say that complete liberty and effective equality are
mutually consistent in this sphere.
But even this is not really satisfactory in the face of massive
inequality and vast fortunes. Public opinion emerges, not from a
mysterious (if not “mystical”) discursive soup, but rather from a
definite discursive ecology, in which ideas have characteristic
points of origin, channels of disseminations, ranks in status or
other attractive or repellent characteristics, and so forth.
Attitudes and assumptions, the obvious and the unthinkable, can
get locked in, and they can get disrupted. The political economy
of a polity is also an opinion economy, or ecology, favoring certain
species of ideas (or certain classes of originators and
disseminators of ideas).
16. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927); JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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Inasmuch as the content of public opinion determines (and
in some sense just is) the standard of legitimacy that elections
enforce, the role of money in setting up think tanks, advocacy
groups, media empires, and so forth, shapes the substance of
public opinion in ways that precede money’s role in elections. If it
is sensible for the public to doubt the “integrity” of elections in
which money exercises too much influence (whatever exactly “too
much” turns out to mean), it does not seem a confusion to be
worried also about money’s influence on the formation of opinion
in the broader institutional ecology. Indeed, while no one would
call culture an “administrative” domain of the state, as Post
proposes to do for elections, there is certainly a plausible case to
be made for the importance of fostering diverse and, especially,
heterodox voices within a country’s various battles of intellectual
and cultural opinion. (No less a civil libertarian than John Stuart
Mill insisted on the necessity of confrontation with unwelcome,
marginal, and surprising ideas for the development of opinion,
though he said little about the institutional setting in which this
17
should take place. ) The means of pursuing this goal may include
antitrust regulation in media, net neutrality rules, public media,
subsidies in art and culture (whose relative independence from
majoritarian pressures is obviously important if they are to foster
counter-majoritarian opinion), tax policy that limits the power of
great wealth to convert itself advantageously into advocacy nonprofits, and generous funding of independent public universities.
Direct limits on spending in opinion formation would be clunky
and smack of illiberalism, and the country is better off treating
them as presumptively unconstitutional; but it is also possible to
imagine various of the policies listed in the last sentence, at least
in certain versions, coming under attack under the newly
18
expansive anti-regulatory First Amendment. As structural
contours channeling the flow of money in public-opinion
formation, such regulation should be presumptively legitimate,
even though they do not address the special domain of elections
but rather the “upstream” activity of opinion formation.
***
To my mind, the harder question is whether the diffuse sense
that Citizens United stands for an anti-democratic, anti-civic
17. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
18. See Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014) (so arguing).
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tendency in American law and life can produce the kind of
popular-constitutional energy that could power whatever
doctrinal formula might come to name the power to regulate
electoral spending. Whether we imagine that politics as a focusing
and decisive constitutional moment of the kind Bruce Ackerman
has theorized or as the more diffuse and contingent work of
movements and rhetoricians that Robert Post and Reva Siegel
have explored, it is noteworthy that some of the most capable and
ambitious scholars to engage the problem of money in politics
19
have moved to put at least one foot in movement-building. I
think of Larry Lessig, who at the time that I revised this Essay had
recently led a band of anti-Citizens United marchers on a chilly
pilgrimage through New Hampshire, and of Zephyr Teachout,
who (with her running mate Professor Tim Wu) in 2014 made an
astonishingly effective primary challenge to New York’s sitting
governor in the Democratic primary. This is unusual, to say the
least: scholars may align themselves with movements—many in
human rights and environmental law do so quite organically; but
to put one’s shoulder to the wheel of creation is another thing.
Does it say anything about the politics we are waiting for that we
are either waiting or, among the bold, going out to try to make it?
Why, in other words, has it not arisen spontaneously in a more
definite and effective form?
I can’t even speculate on this question with any institutional
or historical refinement, but I can offer a few stray thoughts about
the inhibitions such a politics faces in this cultural moment. For
one, this is a time of political mistrust and disgust: toward all three
branches of government and toward partisans on the other side of
20
the aisle. It is a heyday for mobilizing sentiment against some
source of grievance: Obamacare, the Iraq war, Citizens United. It
is a harder time for generating enough agenda overlap, confidence
in institutions, and capacity for compromise to agree on new
ground rules for something as basic to democracy as campaign
finance. Every issue that becomes politically salient tends to
become partisan, often in ways that have more to do with imputed
19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE (setting out theory of constitutional
moments); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25–34 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
20. See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 13,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/ (finding that
“trust in the government remains near historic lows”); Political Polarization in the
American Public: Growing Partisan Antipathy, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-2-growing-partisan-antipathy/ (reporting
“a rising tide of mutual antipathy” between members of the major parties).
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cultural meaning than with any more concrete merits: consider
climate change, on its face a scientific and technical problem of
overarching public concern, in practice a partisan lightning-rod
21
and point of catechisms, left and right. This could only go double
for a measure that laid the ground rules for pursuit of political
power, as campaign finance law does. The shoals of suspicion and
dissension should be expected to claim many worthy vessels here.
That first concern has to do with partisanship—which is a
perfectly legitimate, even important attitude, but which has a
particular unconstructive cast just now, tending to distort the
merits of even the most concrete questions and erode confidence
in institutions that simply must be able to take authoritative
decisions if issues such as campaign finance regulation are to be
resolved. The current partisanship, then, basically impedes the
capacity for governance, and that is what makes it a threat to any
prospect of progress on the challenges we are discussing here.
The second concern I want to raise is even more diffuse, but
I think that it names a real thing nonetheless. It is the cultural
cachet, even hegemony, of a certain kind of economistic thinking,
which identifies economic rationality with rationality as such.
Americans live in an economic order that tells us, in a hundred
daily ways, that that all choice is consumer choice, all efforts and
relationships are investment, and that democracy is just a subset
of the market. We see one symptom of this in the Citizens United
opinion, where Justice Kennedy treats voting as a rational
consumer choice (as it would be modeled by the most unworldly
of pre-behavioralist economists), which supports his astonishing
conclusion that more campaign spending just provides more
information to voters, and is in fact a tribute to voters’ power and
reason. But it is a more broadly shared attitude, and its effect is to
erode any distinction between the specifically civic, would-be
egalitarian domain of electoral decision and the pursuit of selfinterest (material and ideological) in the free-for-all marketplace
of ideas, where money and manipulation are the instruments of
persuasion. This economistic attitude fosters the suspicion that
civic language is just a sententious name for one’s own interests
and the views one happens to hold. This suspicion must be partly
true even under the best of circumstances, which is precisely why

21. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, What You “Believe” Bbout Climate Change Doesn’t Reflect
What You Know; It Expresses *Who You Are*, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (Apr.
23, 2014), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/4/23/what-you-believe-about-clim
ate-change-doesnt-reflect-what-yo.html.
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the temptation to adopt it without reservation is acute and
hazardous.
***
I end with something Larry Tribe wrote the year I was born,
about environmental law: on the deepest issues, consistency can
be dangerous. The space in which people can be active and
22
creative is often in the tension between irreconcilable principles.
It is hard to make the case for citizenship and the public
interest, easier to make the case against it. But it only gets harder
if we don’t try; and, we might find, these are ideas we can’t do
without, even if we still need to build the institutions in which they
will make more sense. It’s an irony of politics guided by a reflexive
contempt of government that it tends to starve, constrain, and
distort governance until it has produced contemptible institutions.
If people do not believe that citizenship is distinct from being
a worker, consumer, or boss; if they do not believe it is possible to
think and argue in good faith about something called the public
interest; if they do not believe democracy really is more than an
awkward attendant to twenty-first century capitalism; then they
will have lost a measure of their power to make their own history.

22. Laurence Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees, 83 YALE L.J. 1315
(1974).

